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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Countries may differ in their regulation of important issues such as health, 
safety, environment, security, and financial markets. A world of states with 
different legal systems implies some differences in specific regulations.1 But 
regulatory variation does not stem only from differences among countries’ legal 
systems. Countries may face different problems, stimulating different regulatory 
responses. Or they may have different preferences regarding their regulatory 
responses to a common problem.2 And domestic interest groups, such as local 
businesses and workers, may press the state for regulations that shield them 
from international competition. 
Moreover, the state is not a monolith—within each state or union of states, 
different agencies and subsidiary units may also differ from each other in their 
regulatory approaches.  At the same time, these agencies may share ideas across 
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 1.  See generally KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE 
LAW (Tony Weir trans., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 1998). 
 2.  See, e.g., Alberto Alemanno, Public Perception of Risks Under WTO Law: A Normative 
Perspective, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND THE WTO 270–71 (Geert 
van Calster & Denise Prévost eds., 2012) (noting that because public perceptions of food safety are 
culturally determined, food-safety regulations differ among countries and are, therefore, not necessarily 
systematically due to protectionism).  
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borders with their counterpart agencies in other states.3 Empirical research 
indicates that, rather than adhering to discrete “legal families” or “national 
styles of regulation,”4 actual regulations often differ across countries and even 
within legal systems: countries can be highly selective in specific regulatory 
choices, yielding a complex pattern of particular regulations on particular 
issues.5 For example, in contrast to claims that European risk regulation is 
generally more precautionary than U.S. risk regulation, empirical research finds 
that U.S. and European risk regulation over the past four decades has exhibited 
overall average parity, with occasional divergences as selective precaution is 
applied on both sides to particular risks—including greater precaution against 
some risks in Europe (such as genetically modified foods, hormones in beef, 
toxic chemicals, and climate change), and at the same time greater precaution 
against other risks in the United States (such as mad cow disease in beef and in 
blood, choking hazards in food, particulate matter air pollution, and terrorism).6 
Rough overall regulatory parity can include a variety of regulatory differences 
on specific issues. 
This empirical reality of regulatory parity and variation has an immediate 
implication for debates over international regulatory cooperation (IRC). Fears 
that agreements such as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) would require Europe to lower its regulatory standards are based on a 
premise that European standards are typically more stringent than U.S. 
standards.  But as just noted, the reality is that although some European 
regulatory standards for some issues are more stringent than U.S. standards, 
some U.S. standards for other issues are more stringent than European 
standards. Thus, even if TTIP led to full regulatory convergence, which it may 
not, such convergence would plausibly yield a mix of changes on each side.  It 
could conceivably lead to harmonizing upward to the highest standard in each 
jurisdiction on each issue, rather than harmonizing downward to the lowest 
standards, or converging to an agreed optimal standard.  Or it could leave some 
 
 3.  ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 12–15 (2004) [hereinafter A NEW 
WORLD ORDER]; Anne-Marie Slaughter, America’s Edge: Power in the Networked Century, 88 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, no. 1, Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 94.   
 4.  On “legal families” of countries, see ZWEIGERT & KÖTZ, supra note 1, at 63–73. On “national 
styles of regulation,” see generally DAVID VOGEL, NATIONAL STYLES OF REGULATION: 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES (1986).  
 5.  See generally THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND EUROPE [hereinafter REALITY OF PRECAUTION] (Jonathan B. Wiener, Michael 
D. Rogers, James K. Hammitt & Peter H. Sand eds., 2011) (documenting complex variation in U.S. and 
European risk regulation from 1970 to the present). 
 6.  See Jonathan B. Wiener, Brendon Swedlow, James K. Hammitt, Michael D. Rogers & Peter 
H. Sand, Better Ways to Study Regulatory Elephants, 2/2013 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF RISK 
REGULATION 311, 314–19 (2013) (describing quantitative and qualitative methodologies for studying 
relative precaution and regulatory variation); Jonathan B. Wiener, The Real Pattern of Precaution, in 
REALITY OF PRECAUTION, supra note 5, at 520–34 (synthesizing the study’s findings of selective 
precaution across numerous cases in both Europe and the United States over four decades); see also 
JOAKIM ZANDER, THE APPLICATION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE  2 (2010) 
(finding variation in precautionary policies within Europe as well as across the Atlantic). 
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regulatory variation in place—a scenario that offers opportunities for learning 
over time, as explored further in this article. 
Meanwhile, given the reality of regulatory variation, countries face 
incentives to engage in IRC to coordinate their regulations. The gains from 
international trade in open markets may motivate agreements to reduce 
regulatory barriers to trade. Multinational businesses may press states for a 
level playing field of harmonized regulatory standards across countries. In 
addition, the gains from combating shared problems, such as transboundary 
health, environmental, security, and financial risks, may motivate states and 
multinational advocacy groups to seek agreements on joint international 
regulatory measures.7 
IRC denotes a series of steps to coordinate regulation across countries. It 
often arises from the confluence of regulatory reform efforts, generally 
undertaken at the national level, with trade liberalization efforts that, by 
definition, occur across borders.8 Governments are undertaking a wide array of 
IRC mechanisms today.9 IRC has been endorsed by President Obama’s 
Executive Order (EO) 13,609, and is currently being pursued in international 
trade negotiations such as TTIP between the United States and the European 
Union (EU), and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) among the United States 
and a dozen countries bordering the Pacific Ocean.10  As a result of this rapid 
and multiplex spread of IRC, a web of formal and informal intergovernmental 
regulatory relationships is emerging that simultaneously empowers and 
constrains governments’ abilities to solve problems through regulation. 
We focus on an important consideration that may be neglected in current 
efforts to attain international regulatory convergence: The benefits of learning 
from regulatory variation, and the design of institutions to promote such 
 
 7.  See generally SCOTT BARRETT, WHY COOPERATE? THE INCENTIVE TO SUPPLY GLOBAL 
PUBLIC GOODS (2007).  
 8.  Alberto Alemanno, Is There a Role for Cost-Benefit Analysis Beyond the Nation-State? 
Lessons from International Regulatory Co-operation, in THE GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 104, 105 (Richard Revesz & Michael Livermore eds., 2013) 
[hereinafter COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS]. 
 9.  For an overview, see Reeve T. Bull, Neysun Mahboubi, Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. 
Wiener, New Approaches to International Regulatory Cooperation: The Challenge of TTIP, TPP, and 
Mega-Regional Trade Agreements, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2015, at 1. According to the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), these arrangements include 
supranational institutions, such as the European Union (EU); international multilateral agreements, 
such as the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade; regional agreements, such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement; bilateral agreements, such as the Australia–New Zealand Closer 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement; and regulatory agreements between subnational governments, 
such as negotiations among Canadian provinces to reduce trade barriers and accords linking carbon 
markets between California and Quebec. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: ADDRESSING GLOBAL CHALLENGES 19–74 (2013) 
[hereinafter OECD 2013]; ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., REGULATORY COOPERATION 
FOR AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 17 (1994) [hereinafter OECD 1994]. 
 10.  For a typology of IRC activities, see ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., 
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: RULES FOR A GLOBAL WORLD 8–10 (Oct. 14, 2012) 
[hereinafter OECD 2012]. 
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learning. In part II, we briefly survey the range of mechanisms for IRC, with 
examples including U.S.–EU, U.S.–Canada, and Australia–New Zealand 
efforts, among others. These IRC efforts can be seen as moves along a spectrum 
from fully uncoordinated regulatory heterogeneity—variation—toward fully 
coordinated regulatory homogeneity—convergence. 
In part III, we highlight the pros and cons of IRC. The benefits of IRC 
include reducing trade barriers, which leads to more open markets and 
improved regulatory approaches. The costs of IRC include not only the time 
spent negotiating agreed standards but also the reduction in regulatory 
variation itself. Regulatory variation may be desirable to match heterogeneous 
local preferences. Further, we emphasize a distinct additional benefit of 
regulatory variation: the opportunity for learning about the impacts of differing 
policies. Such learning can come from observing policy variation in practice, 
from purposeful experimentation with policy alternatives, and from studying 
transitions over time as IRC pushes from variation toward convergence.  Even 
if regulatory convergence is desirable, there can be many possible forms and 
levels of regulatory convergence, such as the choice among the array of 
regulatory instruments or among standards at different levels of stringency.  
Simply seeking convergence does not indicate which form or level of regulation 
would be ideal. Nor does it indicate which mechanism of IRC should be 
employed to move from variation to convergence.  Hasty convergence to one 
current approach may reduce trade barriers but may also entrench a suboptimal 
or arbitrary selection.  Learning about the impacts of regulatory variation—and 
about the impacts of different mechanisms for IRC—can thus be essential to 
making intelligent choices about any moves to convergence. 
In part IV, we discuss the institutional framework needed to promote these 
benefits from both regulatory variation and cooperation. In federal systems, a 
central government may oversee variation among its member states, study the 
impacts of these varying policies, and select the best policy approach for 
broader federal adoption.11 But at the international or global scale, there is no 
central government.12 Although IRC has so far put a priority on reducing 
regulatory variation to reduce trade barriers, we argue that learning from 
regulatory variation should also be an important feature of any IRC effort. 
Interestingly, part of TTIP being discussed so far may offer a new model of IRC 
capable of promoting the alignment of regulations while at the same time 
capitalizing on gains from studying regulatory variation. Its horizontal 
framework for regulatory coherence carries the potential to become a new 
mechanism of IRC, perhaps giving rise to what we propose: A transatlantic 
 
 11.  See Wallace E. Oates, An Essay on Fiscal Federalism, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1120, 1121 (1999) 
(explaining benefits of diverse policies in a federal system, including the ability of the central federal 
government to study and select the best option).  
 12.  Although both TTIP and TPP envisage the setting up of institutional mechanisms to 
administer the agreements, these will not likely be entrusted with autonomous regulatory authority. In 
part II, infra, we discuss examples of IRC that do include setting up new joint regulatory authorities, 
such as the joint food-safety regulator created by Australia and New Zealand.  
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regulatory laboratory, in which regulators, experts, and others can study and 
learn from both observed and experimental tests of differing regulatory 
approaches.13 As a model for other IRC efforts in other trade agreements and 
regions, this idea of a transatlantic regulatory laboratory may, in turn, represent 
a stepping-stone toward a global policy laboratory. 
II 
MECHANISMS AND EXAMPLES OF IRC 
A. Background 
The trend toward international cooperation among regulators has become a 
significant feature of regulatory policy in recent years.14 Regulators are 
becoming the new diplomats. As Anne-Marie Slaughter has observed, they are 
“on the front lines of issues that were once the exclusive preserve of domestic 
policy, but that now cannot be resolved by national authorities alone.”15 
Although regulation has been a state prerogative, in an increasingly 
interdependent world, many regulatory issues are addressed in international 
fora where delegates from multiple national agencies may in turn produce a 
wide array of “supra regulations” at both multinational and regional levels.16 
Early calls for IRC included recommendations by the Administrative 
Conference of the United States (ACUS) recommendations in Federal Agency 
Cooperation with Foreign Government Regulators17 and the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) report, Regulatory Co-
operation for an Interdependent World.18 More recently, the OECD issued its 
Recommendations on Regulatory Policy and Governance, of which 
recommendation number twelve calls for strengthened IRC,19 and the OECD 
 
 13.  Wiener, supra note 6, at 522; Jonathan B. Wiener, The Diffusion of Regulatory Oversight, in 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 8, at 136; see also infra Part IV.  
 14. Bull et al., supra note 9; NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 15–18; Lorenzo Allio & 
Stephane Jacobzone, Regulatory Policy at the Crossroads: the Role of the OECD in Mapping an Agenda 
for the Future, in BETTER BUSINESS REGULATION IN A RISK SOCIETY 209, 218–19 (Alberto 
Alemanno, Frank den Butter, André Nijsen & Jacopo Torriti eds., 2012); Bengt Jacobsson, Regulated 
Regulators: Global Trends of State Transformation, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: 
INSTITUTIONAL DYNAMICS OF REGULATION 205, 222 (Marie Laurie Djelic & Kerstin Sahlin-
Andersson eds., 2006). 
 15.  NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 63. 
 16.  Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods, In Whose Benefit? Explaining Regulatory Change in Global 
Politics, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 1, 1–43 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds. 2009) 
(surveying research explaining regulatory outcomes at the global level through supply and demand 
forces that include cooperation among national regulators as well as among private transnational 
actors).  
 17.  See generally ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 
91-1: FEDERAL AGENCY COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENT REGULATORS (1991).  
 18.  See generally OECD 1994, supra note 9.  
 19.  ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL ON 
REGULATORY POLICY AND GOVERNANCE 5 (Mar. 22, 2012). 
WIENER & ALEMANNO_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2016  2:42 PM 
108 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 78:103 
has provided a detailed typology of numerous mechanisms of IRC.20 Following 
a renewed ACUS report and recommendation on IRC,21 President Barack 
Obama issued EO 13,609, calling on all U.S. federal agencies to promote IRC22 
and, thereby, to help invigorate the negotiations in TTIP and TPP. 
Preceding the current negotiations on TTIP and TPP, past examples of IRC 
include the U.S.–EU Transatlantic Economic Council (TEC); the U.S.–Canada 
Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC); and the Australia–New Zealand 
Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) and subsequent Trans-Tasman Mutual 
Recognition Arrangement (TTMRA). These three efforts at IRC aim primarily 
to reduce trade barriers through mutual recognition, harmonized standards, or, 
in the latter case, joint regulation.23 
There are also sector-specific mechanisms for IRC among government 
agencies addressing the same subject matter. For example, the food and drug 
agencies of the United States, EU, Canada, Australia, and Japan, after having 
collaborated through the Global Harmonization Task Force, established the 
International Medical Device Regulators Forum in 2013.24 
More broadly, to reduce unnecessary barriers to trade, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has convened efforts to reconcile differing regulations. 
Such efforts have included the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS).25 
Although the WTO has been successful in removing tariffs and other barriers to 
trade at the border, it has faced greater difficulty in its efforts against nontariff 
barriers, which can be prominent obstacles to trade exchanges.26 This is largely 
due to the methodological and political difficulties encountered in 
distinguishing legitimate regulations from disguised protectionism.27 Given the 
current difficulty for the WTO in effectively addressing such concerns, some 
countries seem willing to go beyond traditional international treaty-making to 
 
 20.  OECD 2012, supra note 10, at 8–10; OECD 2013, supra note 9, at 12–32.  
 21.  MICHAEL T. MCCARTHY, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, INTERNATIONAL 
REGULATORY COOPERATION, 20 YEARS LATER: UPDATING ACUS RECOMMENDATION 91-1 (2011).  
 22.  Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26413 (May 1, 2012). 
 23.  See infra Part II.C. 
 24.  Zachary Brennan, U.S. FDA Working with International Partners on Improved Data-Sharing 
Systems, INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY MONITOR (May 10, 2012). To know 
more, see About IMDRF, INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATORS FORUM, 
http://imdrf.org/about/about.asp (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
 25.  See generally DENISE PREVOST, BALANCING TRADE AND HEALTH IN THE SPS AGREEMENT: 
THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION (2009); RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE WTO AND TECHNICAL 
BARRIERS TO TRADE (Tracey Epps & Michael J. Trebilcock eds., 2013); JOANNE SCOTT, THE WTO 
AGREEMENT ON SANITARY AND PHYTOSANITARY MEASURES: A COMMENTARY (2007). 
 26.  See generally Jörg-Philip Terhechte, Non-Tariff Barriers to Trade, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2014).  
 27.  See, e.g., Gabrielle Marceau & Joel Trachtman, The Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement, the 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade, A 
Map of the World Trade Organization Law of Domestic Regulation of Goods, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 
351, 352 (2002). 
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explore new avenues of cooperation.28 
Similar issues of interstate trade barriers can arise within federal systems 
like the United States or quasi-federal associations like the EU. Both the 
United States and the EU have long employed legal doctrines to prevent their 
member states from discriminating against out-of-state producers. In the United 
States, these doctrines include the U.S. Constitution’s Dormant Commerce 
Clause, which restricts member states’ power to burden interstate commerce;29 
its Supremacy Clause, which authorizes federal preemption of state law;30 the 
federal Spending power;31 and engagements in cooperative federalism through 
state implementation of federal standards.32 
Analogously, the EU has long worked to reduce regulatory trade barriers 
among its member states and move toward a single European market. Through 
high-profile cases regarding beer bottles, waste disposal, and food safety aimed 
at defining the notion of “obstacle to intra-Community trade,” and through the 
European Standardization System’s promotion of the joint development of 
technical product specifications, the EU has established legal doctrines akin to 
the U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause.33 These doctrines protect the single 
European market from trade barriers erected by member-state regulation and 
have enlarged the scope for trade among its expanding set of member states.34 
Akin to cooperative federalism in the United States, the EU often provides that 
EU regulations are to be transposed or implemented by the member states with 
discretion to tailor the EU rules to fit member-state legal systems.35 
Similarly, Australia has taken steps to reduce regulatory trade barriers and 
promote the national market among the states in its federal system and with 
New Zealand.  Australia conducted a National Competition Council effort from 
1995 through 2006 that helped reduce regulatory barriers among its several 
 
 28.  See Alberto Alemanno, The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership and the 
Parliamentary Dimension of Regulatory Cooperation, European Parliament Policy Report 21 (2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2423562.  
 29.  U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3. 
 30.  U.S. CONST. art. VI., cl. 2. 
 31.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 32.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A 
GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1402–03 (1994) 
(comparing dormant commerce clause analysis with GATT Art. XX analysis); Richard L. Revesz, 
Federalism and Environmental Regulation: Lessons for the EU and the International Community, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1331, 1340 (1997) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court prohibits the states from 
discriminating against products from other states); Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and the 
Environment: Lessons from the Federal Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1329, 1335 (1992) (“The 
Supreme Court found in the Commerce Clause the implied power for the Court to invalidate state 
measures that unduly burdened the functioning of the common market among the states.”).  
 33.  ALBERTO ALEMANNO, TRADE IN FOOD: REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES IN THE 
EC AND THE WTO 138 (2007).  
 34.  See generally CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU—THE FOUR 
FREEDOMS (4th ed. 2013). 
 35.  See generally Michal Bobek, The Effects of EU Law in the National Legal Systems, in 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW 140 (Catherine Barnard & Steve Peers eds., 2014).  
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member states and territories pursuant to the 1992 MRA.36 This effort involved 
a series of reports from the states on regulatory obstacles to trade, a 
“competition test” putting the burden on the state to show the public net 
benefits from a policy that posed barriers to entry, and a schedule of penalties 
or payments for states that retained or reformed their entry barriers.37 
In contrast to international agreements among sovereign nation states, these 
federal systems or quasi-federal unions typically have centralized government 
institutions—legislative, executive, and judicial—with constitutional powers 
that include monitoring the policies adopted by the member states, refereeing 
conflicts among the member states, adopting supervening policies that guide or 
preempt the member states’ policies, and enforcing such decisions. Thus, the 
central government can observe the performance of policies across the member 
states and adopt the best policy to apply to all in a system akin to the 
“laboratory of federalism” envisioned by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis 
Brandeis and modeled by economists.38 
This central government role is largely absent at the international level. For 
instance, the WTO can referee trade disputes among its member states and can 
issue decisions that authorize trade remedies, such as retaliatory tariffs. 
However, neither the WTO nor any other international trade institution enjoys 
the powers that central federal governments have to enforce against 
noncompliance, to invalidate an offending member state’s policy, or to adopt 
new supervening policies that preempt those of the member states. Such 
measures at the international level would generally require states to consent to 
such powers in an international accord.39 For example, the EU is a 
supranational organization whose member states have consented to authorizing 
its coercive power to enforce its decisions. In particular, the EU Commission 
may, under Article 258 of the Lisbon Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union,40 bring an EU member state that fails to abide by EU law in 
 
 36.  See NATIONAL COMPETITION COUNCIL, http://ncp.ncc.gov.au (last visited Aug. 28, 2015). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Nicole J. 
Saam & Wolfgang Kerber, Policy Innovation, Decentralised Experimentation, and Laboratory 
Federalism, 16 J. ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES & SOC. SIMULATION, 7, 1.2–1.3 (Jan. 31, 2013); Oates, supra 
note 11, at 1131–34.  
 39. See Bull et al., supra note 9, at 8–9 (distinguishing five structures for IRC and noting that 
adoption of regulatory standards generally involves agreement among member states, such as through 
regulatory treaties to protect the global environment). On the need for states’ consent to international 
treaty law, see Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalism in a Global Economy, 83 VA. L. REV. 1283, 
1314 (1997) (“The basic principle of international law, after all, is that it binds states only with their 
own consent.”); Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES 
COURS D’ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 27 (1989) (“[A] State is not subject to any external 
authority unless it has voluntarily consented to such authority.”); Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways To Make 
International Environmental Law, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 259, 272 (1992) (“The whole structure and content 
of treaty law is based on the principle of consent”); John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: 
A Synthesis of International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT’L L.J. 139, 158 
(1996). 
40.   Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Dec. 13, 2007, 
2012 OJ C326/202. 
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front of the Court of Justice of the EU. In such a case, the Court may order that 
State to pay a penalty fee or lump-sum damages.41 To take another example, the 
UN Security Council enjoys, at least in principle, coercive powers, but it still 
faces a veto by its permanent members and, moreover, seems unlikely to 
venture into policing states’ regulatory policies.42 Unlike national or federal 
governments, most IRC mechanisms to date lack the power to create and 
enforce supervening regulatory rules—unless that power is accorded by the 
member states to an IRC mechanism.43 
B. Mechanisms of IRC 
IRC can be pursued through several mechanisms. In a world of multiple 
jurisdictions, consider a spectrum from fully uncoordinated regulatory 
heterogeneity at one end, to fully uniform regulatory homogeneity at the other. 
At the heterogeneous end of this spectrum, a fully decentralized system could 
have utterly divergent regulations—that is, different for each jurisdiction or 
even different for each person.44 At the homogeneous end of this spectrum, a 
fully centralized system could have utterly convergent regulations—that is, 
universal harmonization, or even a single joint global regulation. 
In the intermediate regions of this spectrum are several steps between 
decentralized heterogeneity and centralized homogeneity. Even without overt 
coordination, similar regulatory approaches may diffuse across countries 
through borrowing or through common responses to the same problem.  An 
OECD “stocktaking” paper identified eleven types of IRC mechanisms amid a 
complex web of actors, epistemic networks, law, and norms.45  In roughly 
increasing order of regulatory homogeneity or convergence, bracketed by full 
heterogeneity and full homogeneity, these eleven mechanisms for IRC include: 
1. Dialogue: informal exchange of information and personnel exchanges to 
foster mutual understanding of each other’s regulations, such as the TEC; 
2. Soft law: cooperation based on nonbinding instruments that enable 
interested parties from other countries to participate in regulatory rulemaking, 
including through notice and comment, stakeholder input, and access to 
information, such as the OECD Guidelines and Principles; 
3. Private codes:  Coordinated technical standards adopted by multinational 
 
 41.  See generally Melanie Smith, The Evolution of Infringement and Sanction Procedures: Of 
Pilots, Diversions, Collisions and Circlings, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EU LAW 350 (Damian 
Chalmers & Anthony Hull eds., 1st ed. 2015).  
 42.  See generally LORAINE SIEVERS & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL (4th ed. 2014). 
 43.  This power has been called positive integration. JAN TINBERGEN, INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 78 (2d ed. 1965). An example of the member states of an IRC mechanism 
deciding to accord it the power to create supervening regulatory standards is the Australia–New 
Zealand food-safety regime, discussed infra in part II.C.3. 
 44.  See Cass R. Sunstein, Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs. Personalized Default 
Rules: A Triptych (May 19, 2013) (preliminary draft) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2171343). 
 45.  OECD 2012, supra note 10, at 8–10; see also OECD 2013, supra note 9, at 19–74.  These 
mechanisms are also discussed in Bull et al., supra note 9, Part III. 
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private standards development organizations, such as transnational industry 
associations, or the International Organization for Standardization (ISO); 
4. Intergovernmental reliance on private codes: The incorporation of 
international private codes into national legislative instruments by means of a 
reference to one or more standards, such as the standards of the  ISO46 or The 
Council of Australian Governments Best Practices Regulation; 
5. Transgovernmental networks: cooperation among agencies or units of 
national governments, based on peer-to-peer ties among regulators developed 
through frequent interaction rather than formal treaty negotiation. Examples 
include the International Competition Network and the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision; 
6. Mutual recognition agreements in national regulatory law: agreements 
that retain different national standards but allow market access upon approval 
by the other’s regulatory authority. An example is the TTMRA between 
Australia and New Zealand; 
7. Regional and international agreements with provisions to reduce 
regulatory barriers to trade, and in some cases to develop harmonized new 
regulatory standards, such as the WTO, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, the South American Mercosur bloc, and possibly TTIP and TPP; 
8. Membership in international organizations: promoting regulatory 
cooperation and sometimes developing international regulatory standards with 
member states’ consent, such as the International Labor Organization, the 
International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Maritime 
Organization, and the OECD; 
9. Regulatory partnerships between countries: informal dialogue or formal 
negotiation of harmonized regulatory standards, such as through the U.S.–
European Commission High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum, the U.S.–
Canada RCC, the Mexico–U.S. RCC, or the TTMRA; 
10. Integration and harmonization through a supranational or joint 
institution: development of the same regulatory standard in each national 
regulation. These include bilateral or multilateral accords to adopt the same 
regulatory standard in each state party, such as international treaties on 
environment, health, and safety.  EU and U.S. federal legislation that supersede 
member state law are strong forms; 
11. Joint regulator: the creation of a single regulatory agency or body to 
promulgate regulations covering two or more jurisdictions, such as the Joint 
Food Standards Australia and New Zealand (FSANZ) agency.47  At the 
 
 46.  See TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS—THE PRIVATIZATION OF 
REGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 5 (2011) (noting that the International Organization for 
Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission account for eighty-five percent of 
all international product standards); Peter Strauss, The Troubling Conjunction of Public and Private 
Law, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION (Francesca Bignami & David Zaring eds.) (2015) 
[hereinafter COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION]. 
 47.  OECD 2012, supra note 10, at 8–10. 
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extreme would be a single global regulator administering a single global 
regulatory law. 
Although useful for explanatory and systematic purposes, this typology does 
not exhaust all possible forms of IRC.  The OECD report was taking stock of 
efforts to date, and the process of IRC exhibits evolution and innovation of new 
forms over time.  Moreover, these mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, and 
multiple IRC mechanisms can be used at the same time in the same field. 
Actual measures may be hybrids or share the features of several IRC 
mechanisms.48 
C. Three Case Studies 
In order to illustrate the state of the IRC debate and different mechanisms 
for regulatory convergence, three of the most recent and significant efforts 
undertaken at promoting regulatory cooperation among OECD countries are 
outlined below. Given their differing levels of ambition and ongoing 
development, they depict the current debate surrounding the future of IRC, and 
they may offer a useful benchmark for assessing the IRC model being 
developed in TTIP.  They also illustrate the need to study and learn from 
variation in both national regulations and IRC mechanisms, as discussed in 
parts III and IV below. 
1. IRC Efforts between the United States and the European Union 
The United States and Europe have enjoyed close economic ties at least 
since World War II. The European Commission declares on its website that 
The transatlantic economic and trade relationship is the backbone of the world 
economy. Together, the European Union and the United States of America account 
for nearly half of the world’s GDP (47%) and one-third of global trade. Every day, 
goods and services worth EUR 2 billion are traded between them. Some 15 million 
jobs depend on the links between the EU and US economies. There is broad 
acknowledgement that this privileged relationship holds more potential for both sides 
[through] efforts to further promote economic convergence and, more specifically, to 
reduce the regulatory obstacles to doing business across the Atlantic. Diverging 
regulations or duplicative requirements often cause unnecessary barriers and costs . . . 
.49 
 
 48.  In the article introducing this issue, Bull, Mahboubi, Stewart, and Wiener identify several 
structures for organizing IRC and several techniques for promoting IRC, with the important feature 
that different techniques may be employed in different structures, yielding a complex and evolving 
pattern of IRC efforts. Bull et al., supra note 9, at 8–12. 
 49.  EU–US Cooperation, DG Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/international-aspects/cooperation-governments/eu-
us/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2015); see also EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY RESEARCH 
SERVICE, TTIP – Regulatory Cooperation (Feb. 17, 2015), http://epthinktank.eu/2015/02/17/ttip-
regulatory-cooperation/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2015) (linking to numerous reports); EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, TTIP and Regulation: An Overview (Feb. 10, 2015), at 4 (“Governments regulate to 
protect people from risks, in particular, to their health and safety, the environment etc. But differences 
in regulation can also restrict trade. Some of these differences are unavoidable, especially when the 
objectives of regulations are different. In many cases, however, regulations are different for reasons 
unrelated to the level of protection they aim at, for instance because regulators in different countries 
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There are surely regulatory differences between the United States and the 
EU that warrant attention. But characterizations of U.S. and EU regulatory 
systems as sharply divergent, such as the notion of a precautionary Europe 
versus a reactive United States, are exaggerated. The reality of U.S. and EU 
risk regulation over the past four decades is overall average parity punctuated 
by occasional divergences that go in both directions—selective precaution on 
both sides of the Atlantic sometimes applied to different risks.50 More generally, 
the United States and Europe are more alike than stereotypes imply.51 
In 1998, the United States and the EU launched the Transatlantic Economic 
Partnership (TEP), which conducted a series of meetings and, in 2002, issued 
Guidelines for Regulatory Cooperation and Transparency.52 By 2005, after the 
launch of its Better Regulation initiative,53 the European Commission had 
indicated new interest in promoting regulatory convergence across the 
Atlantic.54 The Administrator of the U.S. Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs (OIRA) and his European Commission counterparts then launched the 
U.S.–European Commission High Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum 
(HLRCF) in 2005.55 The HLRCF meets approximately annually and conducts a 
variety of bilateral activities to share information and ideas on better regulatory 
approaches, methods of regulatory analysis, and priorities for reform.56 The 
HLRCF played a role in sharing ideas on regulatory impact assessment (RIA) 
and oversight; the European Commission issued Impact Assessment Guidelines 
in 2005, 2006, 2009 and 2015, and created the EU Impact Assessment Board 
(IAB) in 2006 (renamed the Regulatory Scrutiny Board in 2015).57 
 
developed solutions on the basis of domestic considerations rather than in cooperation with regulators 
from other countries. In these cases, regulatory cooperation can avoid unnecessary divergences or 
inconsistencies and make it easier to trade products and supply services, lowering costs and boosting 
economic growth. These are the differences that TTIP intends to address.”),  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153121.1.2%20TTIP%20and%20regulation
%20overview.pdf .  
 50.  Wiener, supra note 6, at 521. 
 51.  PETER BALDWIN, THE NARCISSISM OF MINOR DIFFERENCES: HOW AMERICA AND EUROPE 
ARE ALIKE 10 (2009). 
 52.  UNITED STATES–EUROPEAN UNION HIGH-LEVEL REGULATORY COOPERATION FORUM, 
GUIDELINE ON REGULATORY COOPERATION AND TRANSPARENCY (2002), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/2002-guidelines-on-reg-coop-and-
transparency.pdf. 
 53.  See Jonathan B. Wiener, Better Regulation in Europe, 59 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 447, 447–
48 (2006).  
 54.  THE EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES INITIATIVE TO ENHANCE TRANSATLANTIC 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND GROWTH (2005), http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international 
/files/economic_initiative_summit_05_en.pdf. 
 55.  See United States-European Commission High-Level Regulatory Cooperation Forum, OFFICE 
OF MGMT. & BUDGET, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira_irc_europe (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
 56.  Id.  
 57.  See EUROPEAN COMM’N, IMPACT ASSESSMENT BOARD REPORT FOR 2012 (Jan. 2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/key_docs/docs/iab_report_2012_en_final.pdf. The IAB, 
attached to the EU Commission Secretariat General, operates as the EU counterpart to U.S. OIRA 
(created in 1980). For a comparative analysis of the IAB and OIRA, see generally Jonathan B. Wiener 
& Alberto Alemanno, Comparing Regulatory Oversight Bodies across the Atlantic: The Office of 
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The HLRCF was soon followed by the creation of the TEC in 2007.58 
Launched by German Chancellor Angela Merkel in her role as President of the 
European Council, U.S. President George W. Bush, and European Commission 
President José Manual Barroso, the TEC was the successor to the TEP. The 
TEC meets annually and periodically delegates tasks to the HLRCF.59 The TEC 
addresses several topics of U.S.–EU economic integration, including regulatory 
cooperation.60 Stakeholder groups have been asked to advise the TEC, 
including the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue and the Transatlantic Business 
Dialogue.61 
Meanwhile, the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue between the European 
Parliament and U.S. House of Representatives was launched in 1999.62 In 2007, 
the TEC asked the Transatlantic Legislators’ Dialogue to serve as a formal 
advisory body to the TEC.63 The increasing authority of the European 
Parliament on regulatory issues64 after the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 
2009, made the Dialogue even more relevant to TEC activities, as did 
transatlantic frictions over specific legislation. Examples of such legislation 
include counterterrorism laws, such as the SWIFT accord on tracking funds,65 
 
Information and Regulatory Affairs in the U.S. and the Impact Assessment Board in the EU, in 
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 309 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2010). For 
further comparative analyses of the IAB and OIRA, see generally Cesar Cordova-Novion & Stephane 
Jacobzone, Strengthening the Institutional Setting for Regulatory Reform: The Experience from OECD 
Countries (OECD Working Papers on Public Governance No. 19,2011); Wiener, supra note 13; 
Jonathan B. Wiener & Daniel Lima Ribeiro, Impact Assessment: Diffusion and Integration, in 
COMPARATIVE LAW AND REGULATION, supra note 46. On May 19, 2015, the European Commission 
released important new documents on its Better Regulation efforts, including changing the name of the 
Impact Assessment Board to the Regulatory Scrutiny Board, revising the Board’s membership and 
tasks, and issuing new Impact Assessment Guidelines and supporting materials. See Better Regulation: 
Key Documents, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/better_regulation/key 
_docs_en.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2015). 
 58.  See EU–USA Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 49 (noting the creation of the Transatlantic 
Economic Council in 2007); Transatlantic Economic Council, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/eu/tec/index.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (describing the Transatlantic 
Economic Council).  
 59.  See FRAMEWORK FOR ADVANCING TRANSATLANTIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION BETWEEN 
THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (2007), 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/international/files/tec_framework_en.pdf. 
 60.  Id.  
 61.  See International Aspects, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/ 
international-aspects/ (Nov. 28, 2015). For the TACD specifically see About TACD, TRANS ATLANTIC 
CONSUMER DIALOGUE, http://tacd.org/about-tacd/ (Nov. 28, 2015). For the TABD, see History and 
Mission, TRANS-ATLANTIC BUSINESS COUNCIL, http://www.transatlanticbusiness.org/about-us/history-
mission/ (Nov. 28, 2015). 
 62.  The 1999 Joint Statement on Establishment of TLD, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/intcoop/tld/what_is/joint_statement_en.htm (Nov. 28, 2015). 
 63.  Kristin Archick & Vincent Morelli, The U.S. Congress and the European Parliament: Evolving 
Transatlantic Legislative Cooperation, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 5 (Mar. 20, 2012). 
 64.  See id. at 8 (noting the increased influence of the European Parliament).  
65.   Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing 
and transfer of Financial Messaging Data from the European Union to the United States for the 
purposes of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program, Official Journal of the EU 195/5 (July 27, 2010),  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:84c098b4-275c-49d7-bbf8-
WIENER & ALEMANNO_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2016  2:42 PM 
116 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 78:103 
and corporate governance laws, such as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002.66 
Other examples span from chemical regulation laws to limits on greenhouse gas 
emissions.67 The failed ratification of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 
which was rejected by the European Parliament, presents yet another example.68 
Further, the European Parliament has now created its own Impact Assessment 
Unit to assess legislative amendments and to follow the work of the 
Commission’s IAB.69 
At the TEC’s request, the HLRCF produced a joint statement, Common 
Understanding on Regulatory Principles and Best Practices, in June 2011.70 In 
this document, 
the United States (U.S.) and the European Commission (EC) reaffirm their shared 
commitment to the following regulatory principles, as embedded in the EC’s 
Communication on Smart Regulation and Impact Assessment Guidelines, and 
Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 in the U.S.: 
(1) evidence-based policy-making for all regulatory measures likely to have significant 
impacts, with consideration of all relevant benefits and costs; 
(2) transparency and openness, allowing participation by citizens and stakeholders; 
(3) analysis of relevant alternatives; 
(4) monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of existing regulatory measures; and 
(5) use of approaches that minimize burden and aim for simplicity.
71
 
That same year, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce released a report 
recommending U.S.–EU cooperation on RIAs of trade impacts.72 ACUS 
reprised its 1991 report on regulatory cooperation by issuing a new report and a 
new recommendation on IRC in December 2011.73 
Soon after, President Obama issued EO 13,609.74 EO 13,609 calls on all U.S. 
federal agencies to “reduce, eliminate, or prevent unnecessary differences in 
regulatory requirements,” new and existing, that may pose barriers to trade; to 
 
73e978be1818.0016.01/DOC_2&format=PDF (last visited Nov. 23, 2015). 
66.     Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in sections of 11, 15, 
18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 67.   Archick & Morelli, supra note 63, at 9–10. 
 68.  Id. at 11. On July 4, 2012, the European Parliament declined its consent, effectively rejecting it, 
478 votes to thirty-nine with 165 abstentions. Id. 
 69.  See Meeting with the Team of the New Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added 
Value, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-secretary-
general/en/activities/recent_activities/articles/articles-2012/articles-2012-october/articles-2012-october-
2.html; Better Law-Making in Action: How Does Ex Ante Impact Assessment Work in the EU?, PARL 
EUR. DOC. PE 528.809 (2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE 
/2015/528809/EPRS_BRI(2015)528809_EN.pdf.  
 70.  UNITED STATES-EUROPEAN COMMISSION HIGH-LEVEL REGULATORY COOPERATION 
FORUM, COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON REGULATORY PRINCIPLES AND BEST PRACTICES 1 (June 
2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/common-understanding-on-
regulatory-principles-and-best-practices.pdf  [hereinafter U.S.–EC HLRCF]. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  JOHN F. MORALL, III, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, DETERMINING COMPATIBLE 
REGULATORY REGIMES BETWEEN THE US AND THE EU 4–8 (2011). 
 73.  McCarthy, supra note 21, at 27–36. 
 74.  Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26413 (May 1, 2012). 
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identify which forthcoming regulations may have significant international 
impacts; and to consider approaches taken in foreign regulations as part of the 
work plan of an RCC. The EO asks the Regulatory Working Group created in 
EO 12,86675 and chaired by the OIRA Administrator, to oversee this effort. 
More broadly, the United States and EU have exchanged ideas on several 
topics to improve regulatory policy.76 These include the adoption of 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA); Regulatory Impact Assessment 
(RIA); regulatory oversight bodies, such as the U.S. OIRA and the EU IAB; 
and economic incentive instruments, such as emissions trading systems for air 
pollutants including sulfur dioxide in the United States and for greenhouse 
gases in the EU. 
To date, IRC between the United States and EU has emphasized the 
development of a common approach to the preparation of regulation through 
RIA, transparency, and sectoral negotiations between agency counterparts. 
Importantly, the HLRCF calls for  
(1) evidence-based policy-making for all regulatory measures likely to have significant 
impacts, with consideration of all relevant benefits and costs; . . . (3) analysis of 
relevant alternatives; [and] (4) monitoring and evaluation of the effectiveness of 
existing regulatory measures”—features that will be crucial to regulatory learning.
77
 
To be sure, this is an ongoing process in which “innovative approaches will be 
necessary . . . the two sides will need to be creative, flexible, and open minded in 
developing and negotiating solutions that respond to the specific characteristics of the 
transatlantic economic relationship.78 
2. IRC Efforts between the United States and Canada 
The United States and Canada are major trading partners with thousands of 
miles of unfenced, shared borders and deeply interdependent economies. They 
are also both federal systems with opportunities to learn from each other about 
improving regulatory policies and institutions. To strengthen these 
relationships, President Barack Obama and Prime Minister Stephen Harper 
launched an innovative IRC arrangement that, though falling short of an 
international trade agreement, provides an original IRC mechanism aimed at 
enhancing regulatory cooperation—the U.S.–Canada RCC.79 
Under the terms of reference of the U.S.–Canada RCC, the Council is 
expected to enhance regulatory cooperation through increased regulatory 
 
 75.  Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993). 
 76.  FABRIZIO DE FRANCESCO, TRANSNATIONAL POLICY INNOVATION: THE OECD AND THE 
DIFFUSION OF REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 57–72 (2013); Wiener, supra note 53, at 449–58; 
Wiener, supra note 6, at 551–55; Jonathan B. Wiener, The Diffusion of Regulatory Oversight, in COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 8,at 126–36; Wiener & Ribeiro, supra note 57.  
 77.  U.S.–EC HLRCF, supra note 70, at 1. On the value of these measures for regulatory learning, 
see infra Part IV. 
 78.  HIGH LEVEL WORKING GROUP ON JOBS AND GROWTH, FINAL REPORT 2 (2013). 
 79.  See U.S.–Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.trade.gov/rcc (last visited Feb. 27, 2015); North America, United States–
Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/oira_irc_north_america (last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (describing the 
RCC).  
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alignment and transparency, such as early warnings; greater alignment in 
regulations and recognition of regulatory practices, such as testing procedures, 
inspection and certification activities, et cetera to avoid duplications;80 and 
smarter, less burdensome regulations in specific sectors.81 As a result, the 
relevant executive branch agencies in the United States and Canada work 
together—by following a previously agreed-upon biannual action plan—to 
identify and align existing federal regulatory systems or, absent such alignment, 
to encourage the adoption of other measures that make it easier to conduct 
business between the two countries.82 The U.S.–Canada RCC seeks to reduce 
obstacles to trade across the U.S.–Canada border and, thereby, enables 
resources to be focused on policing the external borders around the United 
States and Canada.83 
The U.S.–Canada RCC issued its Joint Action Plan on Regulatory 
Cooperation in December 2011. The plan addressed twenty-nine sectoral topics 
in four key areas: agriculture and food, health and consumer products, 
environment, and transport.84 Bilateral working groups involving many different 
agencies of each government convened to prepare two-year work plans, which 
were issued on July 30, 2012.85 Meanwhile, President Obama issued EO 13,609 
in May 2012,86 adding impetus to U.S. agencies’ interactions with their 
counterparts in Canada. 
Examples of the kinds of regulatory harmonization that the U.S.–Canada 
RCC has promoted include: creating the Common Electronic Submission 
Gateway for pharmaceutical drug approval applications to be submitted 
simultaneously to both Health Canada and the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration; aligning product approvals and maximum residue limits for 
pesticides by the U.S. EPA and the Canadian Pest Management Regulatory 
Agency; and reconciling conflicting rules on product packaging.87 
 
 80.  Instead of requiring firms to go through these steps in both countries, the RCC encourages 
moves toward mutual recognition of each other’s regulatory determinations so that inspection, filing, 
testing, and approval in one country will suffice to market products in both countries. See 
REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL JOINT ACTION PLAN (2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/us-canada_rcc_joint_action_plan.pdf.  
 81.  TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES–CANADA REGULATORY COOPERATION 
COUNCIL (2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/us-
canada_rcc_terms_of_reference.pdf. 
 82.  See REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL JOINT ACTION PLAN (2011), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/us-canada_rcc_joint_action_plan.pdf.; 
REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL JOINT FORWARD PLAN (2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/us-canada-rcc-joint-forward-plan.pdf. 
 83.  See U.S.–Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council, INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.trade.gov/rcc (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
 84.  REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL, JOINT ACTION PLAN ON REGULATORY 
COOPERATION 11–25 (2011). 
 85.  Cass Sunstein, Regulatory Cooperation in Action, THE WHITE HOUSE (July 30, 2012), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/07/30/regulatory-cooperation-action. 
 86.  See supra note 74.  
 87.  For the Common Electronic Submissions Gateway, see RCC PERSONAL CARE PRODUCTS 
AND PHARMACEUTICALS WORKING GROUP: COMMON ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION GATEWAY (ESG) 
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3. IRC Efforts between Australia & New Zealand 
Australia and New Zealand also present a long history of cooperation. New 
Zealand was part of the Federal Council of Australasia in the 1890s and was 
invited to be a member of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 but declined 
and became a separate country. The two countries shared Olympic teams in 
1908 and a joint army corps in World Wars I and II. In 1983, the Closer 
Economic Relations Trade Agreement substantially advanced efforts to reduce 
barriers to trade.88 A Memorandum of Understanding on Harmonization of 
Business Law was issued jointly in 1988 and a Memorandum of Understanding 
on Business Law Coordination in 2000.89 
Mutual recognition plays a major role in IRC between Australia and New 
Zealand. The MRA90 and the TTMRA91 significantly boosted regulatory 
cooperation across the Tasman Sea.92 Prodded by the Australian National 
Competition Council, the MRA helped align regulatory policies among the 
member states and territories within Australia.93 The TTMRA extended this 
effort across the border to New Zealand by creating a process for mutual 
recognition, which provided that sales of goods and occupations would be valid 
in both countries once licensed or valid in either country.94 It does allow 
exceptions, however; temporary exceptions can be granted by bilateral 
Ministerial Councils for health and safety reasons, and permanent exceptions 
are included in the TTMRA for a list of products.95 Mutual recognition does not 
apply to certain other aspects of sales of goods, such as minimum age limits for 
young people to buy alcohol, which may vary between Australia and New 
Zealand.96 The Ministerial Councils issue annual cooperation reports, and every 
five years, the regime is evaluated by the Australian Productivity Commission 
and its New Zealand counterpart.97 The states and territories of Australia 
 
PLAN (2012), http://www.trade.gov/rcc/documents/Common-Electronic-Submissions-Gateway.pdf. 
Regarding product approvals and maximum residue levels for pesticides see CROP PRODUCTS 
PROTECTION WORKING GROUP: CROP PROTECTION PRODUCTS WORK PLAN (2012), 
http://www.trade.gov/rcc/documents/Crop-Protection-Products.pdf. 
 88. See AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND CLOSER ECONOMIC RELATIONS TRADE AGREEMENT 
(1983), http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/anzcerta/Documents/anzcerta1.pdf.  
 89.  Memorandum of Understanding on Coordination of Business Law between Australia and New 
Zealand, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT, THE TREASURY (Feb. 22, 2006), http://archive.treasury. 
gov.au/contentitem.asp?ContentID=1073.  
 90.  Agreement Relating to Mutual Recognition (May 11, 1992) https://www.coag.gov 
.au/sites/default/files/mra_text.pdf.  
 91.  Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement (May 1, 1998), https://www.coag. 
gov.au/the_trans-tasman_mutual_recognition_arrangement. 
 92.  Elena Churchman, Mutual Recognition Agreement and Equivalence Agreements, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH AND THE WTO 280 (Geert van Calster & 
Denise Prévost eds., 2012). 
 93.  See About Us, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL COMPETITION COUNCIL, http://ncc.gov.au/about/ 
about_us (last visited Feb. 27, 2015). 
 94.  Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement, supra note 91. 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  AUSTRALIAN PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION REVIEW OF MUTUAL RECOGNITION SCHEMES 
WIENER & ALEMANNO_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 1/8/2016  2:42 PM 
120 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 78:103 
remain involved through the Council of Australian Governments and its 
Committee on Regulatory Reform.98 
Even more ambitiously, Australia and New Zealand have pursued IRC to 
create joint regulation and even a joint regulatory agency. Australia and New 
Zealand entered into a Joint Food Standards Setting Treaty,99 which led to the 
creation of a joint Food Standards Code and to a single regulator, Food 
Standards Australia and New Zealand (FSANZ).100 Thus, food safety is jointly 
regulated by a single body with standards that cover both countries. The two 
countries were considering an extension to create joint standards and a joint 
regulator for therapeutic pharmaceutical drug licensing, the Therapeutic 
Products Agency, but the two sides agreed to cease these efforts in November 
2014.101 
Moreover, Australia and New Zealand have taken steps to evaluate and 
learn from variation in their regulatory standards. The Single Economic Market 
Agreement created a Trans-Tasman Outcomes Implementation Group to 
assess regulatory outcomes, as opposed to inputs or processes, as a measure for 
mutual recognition and harmonization.102 
All of these steps have been facilitated by the longstanding, close 
relationship between Australia and New Zealand and by the large share of each 
country’s trade represented by the other. The Australian Productivity 
Commission found that the TTMRA process has been largely successful and 
should also expand its coverage and strengthen its implementation.103 
4. Comparing the Cases 
These cases vary in their histories, institutions, actors, functions, powers, 
and policy instruments, from the least integrated model of integration, the U.S.–
EU experience, to the most integrated, the Australia–New Zealand version. 
 
(Jan. 2009), http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/study/mutual-recognition-schemes; AUSTRALIAN 
PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION, RESEARCH REPORT ON MUTUAL RECOGNITION SCHEMES (Sept. 
2015), http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/mutual-recognition-schemes#report (last visited Nov. 
23, 2015).  
 98.  See COUNCIL OF AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENTS, https://www.coag.gov.au (last visited Aug. 28, 
2015). 
 99.  Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand 
Concerning a Joint Food Standards System, Austl.–N.Z., Dec. 5, 1995, http://www.foodstandards.gov 
.au/about/background/documents/41A%20Treaty%20amendments%202012%20UNOFFICAL.pdf. 
 100.  See FOOD STANDARDS AUSTRALIA NEW ZEALAND, http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/code 
/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2015). 
 101.  See Statement of Intent, ANZTPA, http://www.anztpa.org/about/soi.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 
2015); Joint statement by Hon Peter Dutton MP, Minister for Health for Australia, and Hon Dr Jonathan 
Coleman, Minister of Health for New Zealand, regarding ANZTPA, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, http://www.health.gov.au/internet/ministers/publishing.nsf/Content/health-
mediarel-yr2014-dutton100.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2015) (announcing their agreement to cease 
efforts to create the ANZTPA). 
 102.  TRANS-TASMAN OUTCOMES IMPLEMENTATION GROUP REPORT NOVEMBER 2014 (2014), 
http://ttoig.treasury.gov.au/content/six_monthly/downloads/november_2014.pdf. 
 103.  AUSTRALIAN PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N (2009), supra note 97 at XXXIX–XLIX; AUSTRALIAN 
PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N (2015), supra note 97, at 2 (recommending more effective implementation). 
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These three models entail different levels of cooperation and employ different 
instruments. Further careful empirical evaluation of the benefits and costs of 
these three efforts is warranted—illustrating the value of learning from 
variation across IRC mechanisms. 
The various and multiplex U.S.–EU initiatives on IRC hoped to reduce 
trade conflicts and trade barriers, especially via the TEC, and to share ideas on 
better regulation. As recognized by the final report of the High Level Working 
Group on Jobs and Growth launching the TTIP negotiations, the results to date 
have been modest.104 Yet these same initiatives played an important role in 
preparing the ground for a renewed regulatory cooperation dialogue between 
the two sides of the Atlantic.105 They promoted dialogue between the IAB and 
OIRA through the HLRCF and helped shape the creation of the EU IAB.106 
These developments are of great potential importance to future methodological 
convergence in regulatory processes and provided an important point of 
reference for the TTIP negotiations.107 The U.S.–Canada RCC effort is still 
underway; its twenty-nine sector-specific Work Plans have recently been 
launched.108 The Australia–New Zealand efforts on IRC, by comparison, are the 
most longstanding and ambitious. They began as early as 1983 and have 
included not only meetings to identify unnecessary regulatory differences but 
also two formal agreements on mutual recognition, the MRA in 1992 and the 
TTMRA in 1998.109 Moreover, Australia–New Zealand cooperation has created 
a single regulatory code and a single regulatory agency on food standards.110 
In practice, of course, efforts toward IRC are constrained by several factors 
that may vary across countries. These constraints include the concerns of some 
interest groups that IRC will mean harmonizing down (a race to the bottom), 
and the concerns of other interest groups that IRC will mean harmonizing up (a 
race to the top); restrictions on sharing information across countries or 
agencies; limited agency staff and resources; and preexisting constitutional and 
statutory requirements for making regulatory changes, both substantive 
(regarding regulatory standards) and procedural (regarding legislative and 
 
 104.  FINAL REPORT HIGH LEVEL WORKING GROUP ON JOBS AND GROWTH (2013), 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/february/tradoc_150519.pdf. 
 105.  Office of Management and Budget, Europe, THE WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse. 
gov/omb/oira_irc_europe (last visited Aug. 28, 2015). 
 106.  See Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, Comparing Regulatory Oversight Bodies 
Across the Atlantic: The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the U.S. and the Impact 
Assessment Board in the EU, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 309, 333 (Susan Rose-
Ackerman & Peter Lindseth eds., 2010). 
 107.  Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 57, at 332–33.  
 108.  See REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL JOINT FORWARD PLAN (2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/us-canada-rcc-joint-forward-plan.pdf. 
 109.  Trans-Tasman Mutual Recognition Arrangement, supra note 91.; Agreement Between the 
Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand Concerning a Joint Food Standards 
System, supra note 99.  
 110.  Agreement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand 
Concerning a Joint Food Standards System, supra note 99.  
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administrative procedures such as transparency, confidentiality, public input, 
and executive and judicial review).111 
Advancing IRC can be intertwined with the domestic politics of 
international free-trade negotiations, such as the need to secure legislative 
ratification of trade deals, at least in separation-of-powers systems like that of 
the United States.  In the U.S. system, the President typically seeks so-called 
“fast-track” Trade Promotion Authority from Congress in order to prevent 
amendments, thereby safeguarding the credibility of the commitments in the 
international trade deal.112 
III 
PROS AND CONS OF IRC 
IRC poses both benefits and costs. This part highlights the most important 
of these pros and cons.  In addition to the benefit of reducing trade barriers 
through regulatory convergence and the counterpart benefit of matching local 
preferences through regulatory variation, we emphasize an oft-neglected 
benefit of regulatory variation: the opportunity to learn about the impacts of 
different regulatory approaches and thereby maintain optimal variation or 
select the optimal approach for convergence.113 
A. Benefits of IRC 
1. Reducing Trade Barriers 
Using IRC to reduce trade barriers can be desirable when the benefits of 
expanding trade through harmonizing regulations are greater than the benefits 
of such regulatory differences, that is, greater than the costs of harmonizing 
differing regulations.114 Globalization has meant increased flows of trade in 
goods, services, data, and people across national borders. Differing regulations, 
even if not discriminatory against out-of-state producers, may pose barriers to 
 
 111.  See AUSTRALIAN PRODUCTIVITY COMM’N, AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND 
COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION REGIMES 52 (Dec. 2004); MCCARTHY, supra note 21, at 
25–27.  
 112.  Trade Promotion Authority can be conferred under 19 U.S.C. 2191.  In June 2015, President 
Obama won Congressional approval for fast-track Trade Promotion Authority for the current TPP 
negotiations, thus limiting Congress to an up or down vote without amendments when the trade deal is 
eventually presented to Congress. Greg Nelson, On Trade, Here’s What the President Signed into Law, 
THE WHITE HOUSE (June 29, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2015/06/29/trade-here-s-what-
president-signed-law. Similarly, in the EU, EU Parliament approval is required for an international 
trade agreement to enter into force with respect to the EU, but the Parliament can either vote in favor 
of the negotiated text or against it without being able to amend it. See European Parliament Rules of 
Procedure OJ 2011 L116, 1, 90(7) and 90(9).  
 113. In addition to studying variation across national regulations, the learning process that we 
propose could also study variation across the IRC mechanisms being pursued by groups of countries 
around the world (described in part II supra).  Learning from variation across IRC will be important in 
evaluating which approaches to IRC are associated with which impacts and outcomes, and thereby in 
selecting the best approaches to IRC. 
 114.  See generally OECD 2013, supra note 9.   
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this increase in trade by requiring conformity to different standards in different 
countries.115 IRC seeks to make national standards more similar or convergent 
in order to accommodate the gains that firms and consumers would enjoy from 
more open trade. 
2. Reducing Interjurisdictional Spillovers 
Another potential adverse consequence of differing regulatory standards 
may be that they shift risky activities from more-regulated to less-regulated 
jurisdictions while still generating transboundary spillovers—interstate 
externalities. For example, differing limits on greenhouse gas emissions may 
induce “leakage” of emitting activities from more-regulated to less-regulated 
jurisdictions.116 Controlling interjurisdictional spillovers is arguably the major 
rationale for central governments of federal systems to adopt supervening 
regulations that preempt variation across member states.117 In international 
systems without a central government, IRC may reduce interjurisdictional 
spillovers by moving along the spectrum from uncoordinated, heterogeneous 
regulations toward more-coordinated, homogeneous regulations—convergence 
via harmonization or joint regulation, thereby reducing the incentive for 
regulated activities and their impacts to shift. 
Growing interconnectedness means that activities in one country, such as 
pollution, finance, transport, telecommunications, and terrorism, increasingly 
have impacts in other countries that propagate more rapidly through shared 
networks.118 Accordingly, demand has grown for IRC to support collective 
action for shared risk management, such as treaty negotiations in which 
countries cooperate on international regulatory standards and the creation of 
new international institutions.119 Here, IRC is not just harmonizing national 
standards but is adopting new international standards and joint risk 
management systems to attain shared benefits.120 This type of IRC seeks to deal 
with transboundary impacts and management of global public goods. 
3. Reducing Perverse Regulatory Competition 
A longstanding concern regarding uncoordinated regulation in multiple 
jurisdictions is that governments might compete by adjusting their regulatory 
 
 115.  See ALBERTO ALEMANNO, THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP 
AND THE PARLIAMENTARY DIMENSION OF REGULATORY COOPERATION 21 (2014). 
 116.  Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 
U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1967–70 (2007). 
 117.  Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2341, 2343 (1996). 
 118.  Jonathan B. Wiener, The Rhetoric of Precaution, in THE REALITY OF PRECAUTION, supra 
note 5, at 3–4; NEW WORLD ORDER, supra note 3, at 1–4. 
 119.  See Barrett, supra note 7, at 1–2 (describing public goods and their universal desirability); 
Robert O. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 141, 170 
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983) (noting that public goods give rise to demand for international 
regimes).  
 120.  Alemanno, supra note 8, at 104. 
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standards in order to attract desirable residents.121 Jurisdictions might race to 
the bottom by relaxing standards to attract industry; alternatively, they might 
race to the top by tightening standards to attract households, workers, investors, 
and cleaner industry. Yet these scenarios are contested.122 Provided that 
interjurisdictional spillovers are well controlled, advocates of regulatory 
competition argue that it may desirably induce jurisdictions to offer a varied 
array of choices enabling each prospective resident to select his or her preferred 
combination of attributes,123 and that efforts to suppress such regulatory 
competition may only drive it into other policy domains, such as public-
spending programs, with even worse outcomes.124 
B. Costs of IRC 
If IRC means moving toward greater convergence and regulatory 
homogeneity, it poses several costs. Several of these arise from the foregone 
benefits of regulatory heterogeneity or variation. 
1. Negotiation Costs 
An obvious cost of IRC is the time spent negotiating and carrying out 
coordination agreements, which could be spent on other endeavors. The cost is 
not just the time spent, but also its opportunity cost—what those public officials 
could have accomplished doing something else. And it is not just the time in the 
negotiations themselves, but also in implementing any agreed IRC measures; 
monitoring other countries’ compliance; seeking remedies for violations, which 
themselves may be costly in diplomatic relations; and so on. 
2. Mismatching Local Preferences and Circumstances 
Variation in national regulations can be worthwhile to match heterogeneous 
local preferences and circumstances. For example, different populations may 
prefer different portfolios of environmental risk, economic risk, and security 
risk, and, hence, different combinations of regulatory protections. Or the 
benefits and costs of regulations could vary because of differing local 
 
 121.  Daniel C. Esty & Damien Géradin, Regulatory Co-Opetition, in REGULATORY COMPETITION 
AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 30, 37 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien 
Gerardin eds., 2001).  
 122.  See, e.g., Anthony Ogus, Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of 
Economic Analysis to Comparative Law, 48 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 405, 406 (1999).  
 123.  See Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions: 
Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333, 350 (1988) (arguing that 
interjurisdictional competition is efficiency-enhancing); Ogus, supra note 122, at 406 (arguing against 
the position that “convergence of national laws (at least in the business sphere) is invariably desirable 
and that, if necessary, it should be promoted by mandatory harmonisation”); Charles Tiebout, A Pure 
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. OF POL. ECON. 416, 424 (1956) (“If consumer-voters are fully 
mobile, the appropriate local governments, whose revenue-expenditure patterns are set, are adopted by 
the consumer-voters.”). 
 124.  See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race to the 
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1245–54 (1992) 
(discussing the negative implications of attempts to suppress interjurisdictional competition). 
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circumstances, such as different population densities, degrees of exposure to 
pollution, susceptibility to disease, or economic dependence on regulated 
industries. IRC—via harmonization, joint regulation, or other steps toward 
convergence on homogeneous regulatory standards—could conflict with such 
varying preferences and circumstances. Regulatory variation could, in principle, 
increase social well-being if it better matches regulations to local needs and 
interests.125 
Indeed, the gains from international trade themselves derive from the 
differing comparative advantages across countries.126 These advantages, in turn, 
derive from differing technologies, skills, and preferences.127 To some extent, 
regulatory variation across countries could reflect these underlying differences 
and hence countries’ different advantages. In such cases, seeking a level playing 
field or regulatory homogeneity could turn out to undermine the comparative 
advantage basis for the expected gains from trade.128 
Of course, regulatory variation in practice may not optimally match local 
preferences and circumstances.  Variation could derive from past choices that 
are no longer optimal given ongoing economic and social changes, notably 
globalization and consumer interest in products from other jurisdictions.  
Regulatory variation could be attempting to protect from international 
competition the very industries that lack comparative advantage, with 
associated costs to the protectionist jurisdiction’s own consumers. 
3. Regulatory Error 
As regulations converge toward greater homogeneity, societies come to 
depend on fewer or even a single regulatory approach.  Hence, societies face 
the risk that any regulatory error from this approach would be magnified more 
than in a world of diverse regulatory approaches. Just as investment portfolio 
diversity and biological diversity reduce the risk of being wiped out by a 
systemic crash, regulatory diversity can reduce the risk of a major error in the 
choice of the regulatory approach and its consequences. Regulatory variation 
can serve as a kind of portfolio-diversification strategy or insurance, hedging 
against regulatory error, including poor design, risk–risk trade-offs, and other 
flaws that may render policies ineffective or perversely harmful.129 The cost of 
not diversifying may be especially acute when IRC yields not only 
harmonization of national standards but joint regulation and a joint regulatory 
body. It is a risk of centralization and uniformity—especially if the regulatory 
 
 125.  Oates & Schwab, supra note 123, at 350; Ogus, supra note 123, at 406; Revesz, supra note 125, 
at 1211–12; Gregory Shaffer, Reconciling Trade and Regulatory Goals: The Prospects and Limits of New 
Approaches to Transatlantic Governance through Mutual Recognition and Safe Harbor Agreements, 9 
COLUM. J. EUR. L., 29, 34–35 (2002); Tiebout, supra note 123, at 424.  
 126.  See generally JAGDISH N. BHAGWATI, ARVIND PANAGARIYA & T N. SRINIVASAN, 
LECTURES ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE (2d ed. 1998). 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Revesz, supra note 32, at 233. 
 129.  Saam & Kerber, supra note 38, at 12. 
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approach selected for convergence has not been studied and compared to 
alternatives. Hedging against such risks of regulatory error can favor investing 
in a diversified portfolio of regulatory variation. 
4. Lost Learning 
IRC, if it means convergence toward regulatory homogeneity, may forego 
the benefits of learning from regulatory variation. Variation in regulatory 
approaches can offer an opportunity for learning about policy impacts from 
differing approaches and, thus, how to improve regulation in the future. This 
benefit of learning from regulatory variation is important even if local 
preferences do not vary, because different regulatory approaches can yield 
different impacts on the same population. If preferences or circumstances do 
vary, the opportunity for learning from regulatory variation is only 
strengthened. 
At the far end of the spectrum, utterly uncoordinated regulatory 
heterogeneity would mean very high barriers to trade, but, at the other end, 
utterly uniform global regulatory homogeneity via convergence toward 
universal harmonization or a single joint world regulation would mean little or 
no opportunity for learning from variation. In the middle of this spectrum, 
regulatory variation can yield observed differences in impacts that inform 
subsequent improvement, including possible eventual convergence on an 
agreed-upon superior approach. This observation of policy variation is the 
“laboratory” of experimentation cited by Justice Brandeis and modeled by 
economists.130 Convergence without studying prior variation can mean 
harmonization on an arbitrary or suboptimal approach, so learning from 
variation is valuable even if convergence is the ultimate goal. 
The benefits of learning from regulatory variation might be even greater at 
the global level than within one federal system because more data may be 
available on more policies, and the variation in policy designs and impacts may 
be even wider. Moreover, learning from variation deserves special emphasis in 
the context of international regulatory cooperation because the centralized 
institutions for studying variation among subsidiary jurisdictions and for 
selecting the optimal approach tend to be weaker at the international level than 
at the national or federal level.131  And learning can derive not only from 
variation across national regulations, but also from variation across approaches 
to IRC.  
Beyond learning from observing variation as it occurs, regulatory 
alternatives can be tested through purposeful experimentation. These 
experiments can be conducted in the laboratory—that is, with volunteers in a 
 
 130.  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Oates, 
supra note 11, at 1132; Saam & Kerber, supra note 38, at 12–13; see also David Markell, States as 
Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to Our “Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve Our 
Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 347, 410 (1994) (noting that an “enormous 
amount of creative activity is occurring in our laboratories of democracy”).  
 131.  See supra Part II. 
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university research setting,132 or in the field—that is, with real policies applied to 
real populations.133 One jurisdiction can experiment by trying out different 
policies for different subgroups or different policies over time. Governments 
implicitly conduct such policy experiments, but they ought to structure these 
experiments carefully to compare treatment options, monitor performance, and 
evaluate outcomes.134  
Such policy experiments could in theory be randomized, akin to the 
randomized clinical trials used to test medical treatments.135  Randomized 
clinical drug trials typically involve double-blind selection among control and 
treatment groups, using placebos to conceal control group selection, but such 
double-blind methods may be difficult to maintain for regulatory policies. 
Regulatory policies are made transparent for important reasons of 
accountability and democratic governance—at least where required by notice-
and-comment or freedom-of-information laws. Without randomization and 
blind controls, any use of experimental methods in regulation would need to be 
designed to account for the behavioral influences that may arise when regulated 
communities know which treatment they are receiving.136 Moreover, public 
knowledge that the policy is an experiment—and hence alterable once the 
experiment is run—may undermine the credibility of government commitments, 
which may in turn influence how people behave in response to the policy. 
But governments change policies all the time; ex ante transparency about 
temporary experimentation in order to learn therefore may actually be more 
honest and credible about the overall endeavor over time than policies that are 
initially proclaimed as permanent but are also later undone, yielding public 
cynicism and distrust of government.  The more that policies are easily 
reversible—that is, where the cost of reversing a policy choice is low—the more 
that policymakers can purposefully propagate policy variation in order to test 
outcomes and learn.137 
Of course, learning from variation and experimentation also implies that 
there are some costs of trial and error—some policies may fare worse than 
others. The risk of some distributed errors, as well as some successes, is 
 
 132.  See Jens Ludwig, Jeffrey R. Kling & Sendhil Mullainathan, Mechanism Experiments and Policy 
Evaluations, 25 J. ECON. PERSP. 17, 17–18 (2011) (describing experimental policy evaluations in 
laboratory settings). 
 133.  See Michael Greenstone, Toward a Culture of Persistent Regulatory Experimentation and 
Evaluation, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON REGULATION 111, 118–19 (David Moss & John Cisternino eds., 
2009); Rob van Gestel & Gijs van Dijck, Better Regulation through Experimental Legislation, 17 EUR. 
PUB. L. 539, 541–42 (2011).  
 134.  Lawrence E. McCray, Kenneth A. Oye & Arthur C. Petersen, Planned Adaptation in Risk 
Regulation, 77 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 951, 951–59 (2010); Sofia Ranchordàs, Sunset 
Clauses and Experimental Regulations: Blessing or Curse for Legal Certainty, 36 STATUTE L. REV. 28 
(2015).  
 135.  Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 PENN. L. REV. 929, 
933 (2011); Greenstone, supra note 133, at 114; Ludwig et al., supra note 132, at 31–32. 
 136.  Abramowicz et al., supra note 135, at 933.  
 137.  Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L. J. 480, 553 (2008). 
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inherent in using diversification to reduce the risk of a bigger, long-term 
systemic error and to learn from experience with variation. Understandably, 
regulated communities may object to being the subjects of experimentation.138 
Still, the public may be more likely to accept policy experimentation, just as it 
accepts clinical-drug trials, if the outcomes of the policy options—efficacy, costs, 
and ancillary impacts—are understood to be uncertain ex ante, if the value of 
the policy experimentation endeavor in improving decisions is well explained, if 
the outcomes studies are made publicly available, and if communities have the 
option to volunteer as test subjects.139 A credible and expert body to guide the 
design of policy experiments ex ante, monitor these policy experiments during 
implementation, and evaluate outcomes ex post will be essential to successful 
policy learning.140 
The value of learning from observed policy variation and from purposeful 
experimentation has been emphasized in recent literature on intellectual 
property law, notably patent law, both within the United States and 
internationally.141 If policy variation is highly valuable in patent law, then it may 
be even more valuable in areas of regulation which have even greater 
uncertainty about policy outcomes, such as health and environmental regulation 
and homeland security counterterrorism policies. These are areas in which trial-
and-error costs may be high, but untested policy convergence and errors for 
lack of learning may yield even higher damages, costs, and eventual public 
outcry or dissatisfaction. 
A different literature has advocated an approach similarly labeled 
“experimentalism”142—a term used by Sabel and Simon to refer to regulation 
that sets broad performance objectives while empowering local regulatory 
officials to gather in-depth data on internal industry practices about complex 
technologies and to develop detailed knowledge to require best practices over 
time.143 But this approach is not the same as experimentation across policy 
types. This type of “experimentalism” is just one policy type, that is, one 
instrument in the array of policy tools, and should be compared to other policy 
tools in studies of observed variation or purposeful policy experimentation. 
Indeed, the policy type that Sabel and Simon juxtapose to their version of 
“experimentalism”—the use of economic incentive systems, such as taxes or 
 
 138.  Van Gestel & van Dijck, supra note 133, at 548–52.  
 139.  Ayres & Listokin, Randomizing Law, supra note 135, at 963.  Recruiting volunteer test 
subjects may be in tension with randomized trials. 
 140.  Greenstone, supra note 133, at 119–21 (proposing a regulatory review board to evaluate 
outcomes of policy experiments); McCray et al., supra note 134 (advocating planned monitoring and 
evaluation). 
 141.  John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 
707–09 (2002); Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1584–1605 (2008) 
(arguing that U.S. federal courts have overvalued uniformity); Lisa Oullette, Patent Experimentalism, 
101 VA. L. REV. 65, 87–104 (2015).   
 142.  Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative 
State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 78–93 (2011). 
 143.  Id. 
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tradable permits, which they label “minimalism”144—is neither “minimalist” in 
the sense of minimal intervention or minimal stringency, nor is it anti-
experimental. Rather, initial deployments of economic incentive instruments 
were themselves ambitious experiments,145 and policy experimentation should 
also compare economic-incentive instruments to other policy types. In this 
sense, our advocacy of “experimentation” is broader than Sabel and Simon’s 
usage of “experimentalism” to the extent that the latter term one type of 
regulation whereas the broader term “experimentation” refers to conducting 
experiments to compare across multiple types of regulation. 
Global interconnectedness is also facilitating the innovation and diffusion 
around the world of ideas for better approaches to regulation.146 Some 
regulatory learning does not necessitate cooperation because independent 
actors learn simply by observing and imitating at a distance. But cooperation via 
communicating, exchanging ideas, and bringing experts together to work on 
shared problems can accelerate learning.147 The exchange of regulatory memes 
can lead to hybridization of new approaches, not just convergence on one old 
approach.148 To pursue these opportunities for innovation, IRC should take 
advantage of regulatory differences as a laboratory for comparison and 
learning.149 
Because policy impacts are uncertain ex ante, it is valuable to watch them 
unfold and compare outcomes.150 Studying regulatory variation can help 
overcome the information gaps that often impair government policy design.151 In 
the face of uncertainty and variation, each policy can be seen as an experiment 
that yields a spillover benefit of new information, which others can use to make 
subsequent policy choices.152 The spillover value to other jurisdictions of 
 
 144.  Sabel & Simon, supra note 142, at 74. 
 145.  See Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from 
SO2 Allowance Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 69 (1998); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation 
of Environmental Regulation? 29 CAP. UNIV. L. REV. 21, 32–33 (2001); Richard Schmalensee and 
Robert N. Stavins, The SO2 Allowance Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy 
Experiment, 27 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 103 (2013). 
 146.  David Dolowitz & David Marsh, Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in 
Contemporary Policy Making, 13 GOVERNANCE 5 (2000); Wiener, supra note 53, at 448–49; Wiener, 
supra note 76, at 123. 
 147.  See generally Frank Dobbin, Beth Simmons & Geoffrey Garrett, The Global Diffusion of 
Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?, 33 ANN. REV. SOC. & L. 449, 
463 (2007); PETER GALISON, IMAGE AND LOGIC: A MATERIAL CULTURE OF MICROPHYSICS (1997) 
(discussing “trading zones” in which experts in different disciplines exchange ideas toward new 
insights); THE GLOBAL DIFFUSION OF MARKETS AND DEMOCRACY (Beth A. Simmons, Frank 
Dobbin & Geoffrey Garrett eds., 2008) (documenting the international diffusion of major ideas about 
governance). 
 148.  Wiener, supra note 53, at 448–49; Wiener, supra note 6, at 521. 
 149.  See Greenstone, supra note 133, at 118–19 (explaining benefits of experimentation); Wiener, 
supra note 6, at 522 (proposing international policy laboratory); Wiener, supra note 76, at 136.  
 150.  Greenstone, supra note 133, at 118–19; Listokin, supra note 137, at 483–84. 
 151.  Saam & Kerber, supra note 38, at 12–13. 
 152.  See Oates, supra note 11, at 1133 (noting that states may learn from other states so that the 
diffusion of successful policy innovations may be horizontal). 
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information about policy impacts also implies that individual jurisdictions may 
under-invest in producing this information. IRC, therefore, can play a 
constructive role in correcting this information market failure and promoting 
the evaluation and experimentation of regulatory variation. 
The magnitude of the benefit of learning from variation will depend, among 
other things, on how well the impacts of regulatory variations are studied across 
countries, across agencies, across risks, across international regimes, and over 
time. Variation without good evaluation may not foster learning. The benefit of 
learning from regulatory variation and experimentation should also increase 
with the ex ante uncertainty about regulatory impacts, the inaccuracy or 
incompleteness of ex ante RIAs, the greater accuracy and completeness of ex 
post RIAs or retrospective reviews, the collection of relevant data during the 
period of regulatory implementation, and the careful evaluation of impacts 
compared to alternative scenarios.153 The evaluation of policy impacts can be 
challenging because it requires, first, assessing the full portfolio of important 
benefits, costs, and ancillary impacts,154 and second, comparing actual regulatory 
outcomes to a hypothetical counterfactual of what would have happened absent 
the regulation.155 
Even if IRC is pursuing convergence via harmonized standards, the process 
of IRC itself can be used as an experiment: the change in regulatory impacts can 
be studied during the transition from variation toward convergence. Such 
transitions toward convergence may be desirable—they may already be justified 
based on accumulated learning from past variation—but they too can be studied 
as they proceed through time to identify changing impacts associated with 
changing regulations. This evaluation may, in turn, be useful to other 
jurisdictions. Or the study of changing regulatory impacts during the transition 
from variation to convergence might reveal that the convergence was 
undesirable, perhaps because the initial variation was preferable or because the 
convergence should have moved to a different regulatory approach. In such a 
case, the evaluation should be taken into account in the next round of IRC to 
revise the policies again with continued study and evaluation.  And even if 
regulatory convergence is desirable, the range of different IRC mechanisms to 
pursue convergence offers yet another dimension of variation deserving study 
 
 153.  Greenstone, supra note 133, at 118–19. 
 154.  John D. Graham & Jonathan B. Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VS. RISK: 
TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1, 10–41 (John D. Graham & 
Jonathan B. Wiener eds., 1995) (calling attention to the neglect of ancillary impacts in risk management 
decisions and proposing a framework for assessing both target and ancillary impacts); RICHARD L. 
REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY 47–49 (2008) (advocating attention to 
co-benefits as well as to countervailing risks); Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution in a Multirisk World, in 
HUMAN AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1509, 1513–18 (Dennis D. 
Paustenbach ed., 2002) (advocating analysis of the full portfolio of policy impacts); Wiener, supra note 
76, at 136 (advocating attention to the full portfolio of impacts in the diffusion of regulatory impact 
assessment across countries). 
 155.  Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1111, 1116 
(2002). 
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to inform future selection of approaches to IRC. 
In short, the future of IRC should include cooperation on learning. IRC 
should take advantage of learning from regulatory variation and transition, and 
from variation in the mechanisms of IRC, both through academic research and 
the creation of new international regulatory institutions for comparative policy 
evaluation. IRC institutions attempting to learn from regulatory variation 
should conduct the several types of studies discussed above, including 
observation of variation in practice as well as purposeful experiments when 
appropriate. If IRC were oriented toward regulatory learning, as the HLRCF 
had been recommending through evidence-based reviews, analysis, monitoring, 
and evaluation,156 then learning could count as a benefit of IRC rather than 
foregone learning counting as a cost of IRC. 
It remains to be seen, of course, what sort of institutional framework for 
IRC would best promote the benefits of learning from variation. One 
opportunity is to take advantage of the ongoing global diffusion of impact 
assessment157 to study and gather data about regulatory performance around the 
world. A database of impact assessments could help provide the grist for 
quantitative, comparative policy evaluations. The emphasis on “evidence-based 
regulation” in the EU Better Regulation initiative may offer an opportunity to 
conduct selected policy experiments.158 But IA systems to date have mostly 
produced ex ante forecasts of future impacts; we also need ex post or 
retrospective reviews to evaluate regulatory performance.159 These ex post 
studies of regulatory outcomes would be analogous to patient-outcomes studies 
in medicine.160 Other possible analogs include the Health Effects Institute 
studies of air pollution, expert panels created to study the cost effectiveness of 
healthcare options, and proposals to create a new independent body to conduct 
retrospective RIAs in the United States. The project of designing an 
institutional body to conduct or coordinate policy evaluation to learn from 
regulation variation at the international level could draw on these and other 
examples. 
 
 
 156.  U.S.–EC HLRCF, supra note 70, at 1. 
 157.  Wiener & Ribeiro, supra note 154.  
 158.  van Gestel & van Dijck 2011, supra note 133, at 539–40. 
 159.  OECD 2012, supra note 8, at ¶ ¶ 10 & 41–56; Greenstone, supra note 133, at 112; Wiener, 
supra note 76, at 136. Following President Obama’s issuance of EO 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3 (2011), 
OIRA has begun to oversee retrospective impact assessments (ex post RIAs). See Cary Coglianese, 
Moving Forward with Regulatory Lookback, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 57, 58–59 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein, 
The Regulatory Lookback, 94 B.U. L. REV. 579, 589–91 (2014);Cass R. Sunstein, Empirically Informed 
Regulation, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 1349, 1366 (2011). In addition, ACUS has undertaken a project to 
document and promote retrospective regulatory reviews. See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 2014-5, RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW OF AGENCY RULES (2014); 
JOSEPH E. ALDY, LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RETROSPECTIVE 
REVIEWS OF AGENCY RULES AND THE EVIDENCE FOR IMPROVING THE DESIGN AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF REGULATORY POLICY 9–10 (2014). 
 160.  Jonathan B. Wiener, Managing the Iatrogenic Risks of Risk Management, 9 RISK: HEALTH 
SAFETY AND ENV’T 39, 56–59 (1998). 
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IV 
TTIP AS A STEPPING-STONE TOWARD A GLOBAL REGULATORY 
LABORATORY 
In laboratory federalism, a central government exists to observe the 
variation across the member states and select the best policy for adoption.161 For 
the most difficult and urgent problems posing broadly felt impacts, the central 
federal government may have economies of scale in expertise and resources as 
well as the authority to prevent interjurisdictional spillovers. Learning from 
variation across the member states may be most valuable for working out 
solutions to midlevel problems,162 especially those posing impacts mainly within 
each member state (though sometimes broader impacts too—consider learning 
from variation across national climate change policies). Solving easy problems, 
meanwhile, may not need much learning.163 
At the international scale, typically there is no central government to study, 
select, and adopt or revise policies. To realize the gains from learning about 
regulatory variation and to shape the selection and design of the best 
approaches, some kind of international body would be needed—a global policy 
laboratory. Without such a mechanism, convergence or harmonization could 
reduce trade barriers but forfeit the benefits of matching regulatory variation to 
local preferences and circumstances, or achieve convergence but at an arbitrary 
point or using a suboptimal policy design. IRC should include not only 
cooperation on reducing trade barriers via regulatory convergence but also 
cooperation on new mechanisms to learn about optimal approaches through 
study and evaluation of the impacts of regulatory variation—including variation 
across national policies, and variation across mechanisms of IRC. 
A step in this direction seems to be contemplated by the negotiators of 
TTIP in their discussions surrounding regulatory coherence. This horizontal 
chapter of TTIP would contain principles and procedures on consultation, 
transparency, impact assessment, and a framework for future cooperation in 
order to provide a “gateway” for handling sectoral regulatory issues between 
the EU and the United States.164 This would apply to all measures of general 
application, including both legislation and rules that have transatlantic trade 
impact. 
Unlike previous IRC efforts toward regulatory convergence, this innovative 
mechanism appears capable of pursuing not only the immediate gains of 
 
 161.  Oates, supra note 11, at 1132; Saam & Kerber, supra note 38, at 12–13. The role of the central 
government in selecting best approaches can also help correct subsidiary jurisdictions’ incentive to 
underinvest in the spillover benefits of information about policy performance. See Steven Callander & 
Bård Harstad, Experimentation in Federal Systems, 130 Q. J. ECON. 951 (2015). 
 162.  K. Kollman, J.H. Miller & S.E. Page, Decentralization and the Search for Policy Solutions, 16 J. 
L. ECON. & ORG. 102, 102–03 (2000). 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  See generally EUR. COMM’N, EU–US TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT. 
PARTNERSHIP, TRADE CROSS-CUTTING DISCIPLINES AND INSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS (2013).  
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regulatory convergence but also longer term learning from regulatory variation. 
Regulatory divergence would no longer be addressed only as a problem to be 
solved with a single template solution, that is, convergence, but would also be 
tackled as a more complex phenomenon that is not only a problem of 
regulatory barriers to trade but also an opportunity to furnish part of the  
solution. Thus, by building upon previous experiences of regulatory 
cooperation, the horizontal coherence chapter of TTIP has the potential to 
offer a new avenue enabling both sides to experiment and learn from regulatory 
variation. 
In order to promote alignment of regulations across the Atlantic, TTIP 
provides an original cooperation mechanism that embeds for the first time the 
application of good regulatory practices, including consultation, transparency, 
and impact assessment (RIA), into a trade agreement without substantially 
altering the parties’ respective ways of making legislation or rules.165 The EU 
and the United States are not limiting themselves to concluding a traditional 
free-trade agreement with provisions to reduce past trade barriers but, instead, 
are striving to come up with a new model of economic integration based on a 
continuing mechanism for IRC.166 
TTIP does not purport to establish a single market spanning the Atlantic—
and no joint regulatory authority is foreseen.  It will instead reduce some 
regulatory barriers to trade, while prompting a new attentiveness by the 
respective regulators to the extraterritorial impacts of their existing and 
proposed regulations. Unlike previous IRC efforts, TTIP is set to create a 
standing mechanism—provisionally called the Regulatory Cooperation Body 
(RCB)—capable of identifying the sectors in which regulations could be aligned 
through regulatory cooperative instruments such as mutual recognition or best 
practices.167 Along these lines, TTIP would become a living agreement, the 
provisions of which will continuously be updated without the need to reopen 
the initial international agreement168 or to modify the parties’ institutional 
frameworks.169 
 
 165.  For an initial analysis of the TTIP Regulatory Cooperation Chapter, see Alberto Alemanno, 
The Regulatory Cooperation Chapter of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership: 
Institutional Structures and Democratic Consequences, 18 J. INT’L ECON. L. 625 (2015). 
 166.  See id. 
 167.  INITIAL PROVISIONS FOR CHAPTER [] REGULATORY COOPERATION 11–12 (2015), 
http://trade.ec. europa .eu/doclib/docs/2015/february/tradoc_153120.pdf.  
 168.  This process for updating an international treaty or trade agreement may operate differently 
from the traditional procedure for the adoption of international agreements through the signature and 
ratification of each new text. In the EU, this issue may be addressed by Article 218(7) of the Lisbon 
Treaty, which states, 
When concluding an agreement, the Council may, by way of derogation from paragraphs 5, 6 
and 9, authorise the negotiator to approve on the Union's behalf modifications to the 
agreement where it provides for them to be adopted by a simplified procedure or by a body 
set up by the agreement. The Council may attach specific conditions to such authorization. 
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Dec. 13, 2007, 2012 OJ 
C326/202. 
 169.  Recent suggestions that the Regulatory Cooperation Body (RCB or Council, RCC) to be 
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Under this framework for ongoing relations, the application of good 
regulatory practices, such as consultation, transparency, and impact assessment, 
with the supervision of the RCB, could induce the respective regulators to think 
in terms of extraterritorial impacts and lead them to align their regulatory 
outcomes while, at the same time, learning from variation. This ongoing process 
might initially address existing regulations by discussing whether to agree on the 
mutual recognition of either the parties’ substantive standards or the results of 
their tests for conformity assessment. Second—amid the application of good 
regulatory practices—an analogous process might also be applied to new or 
revised regulations. 
If well-handled, this ongoing RCB in TTIP has the potential to become a 
kind of transatlantic policy laboratory. Although there are still open questions 
about the functioning and institutional design of TTIP,170 its underlying model of 
IRC seems promising for its ability to study the impacts of regulatory variation 
and evaluate them over time. TTIP could thereby help sustain continuing 
transatlantic regulatory cooperation while informing its members’ consideration 
of whether and how convergence should occur in particular areas, without 
modifying their respective constitutional and administrative law systems. It 
could also help foster the exchange of ideas on improved administrative 
procedures on public input, transparency, ex ante and ex post impact 
assessment, proportionate analysis, adaptive regulation, and related topics. A 
standing framework for policy evaluation under TTIP may nudge regulators to 
discuss and confront their search for regulatory answers to the same problems.171 
Additionally, TTIP could help the parties study regulatory variation by 
carefully comparing policy options, monitoring performance, and evaluating 
outcomes. If well designed, TTIP could create the framework for such learning. 
Thus, for TTIP to develop a successful mechanism of IRC that learns from 
 
created under TTIP may support such ongoing regulatory learning include remarks by Karel de Gucht, 
EU Trade Commissioner, in his speech on October 10, 2013 proposing an RCC to study U.S. and EU 
regulations and recommend joint standards. André Sapir & James Kanter, European Trade Chief 
Proposes Trans-Atlantic Working Group, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 
10/11/business/international/eu-trade-chief-proposes-trans-atlantic-working-group.html?_r=0; see also 
John Graham, former Administrator, U.S. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Testimony 
before the Committee on Trade, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium, on Regulatory Aspects of 
Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), U.S.–EU Free Trade Agreement (Oct. 14, 
2013) (suggesting an approach similar to that espoused by Karel de Gucht).  
 170.  For example, the question arises how the broad scope of TTIP—which potentially might apply 
throughout the regulatory state—will relate to the prerogatives of the EU member states and individual 
U.S. states as well as those of the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress. See ALBERTO 
ALEMANNO, THE TRANSATLANTIC TRADE AND INVESTMENT PARTNERSHIP AND PARLIAMENTARY 
REGULATORY CO-OPERATION, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT POLICY REPORT 43–55 (2014) (discussing 
the scope of TTIP). 
 171.  Critics worry that that the process could become unwieldy. See S. Lester & I. Barbee, 
Regulatory Trade Barriers in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 16 J. OF INT’L ECON. 
L. 847, 865 (2013) (“[I]f every regulation that has an impact on trade—i.e. just about all regulations—
requires consideration of how the other side regulates the same issue, the role of bureaucracy in dealing 
with these issues could actually increase, and as a result this approach may actually raise more problems 
than it solves.”). 
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regulatory variation—both observed variation and purposeful experiments, and 
both national policies and IRC mechanisms—it will be essential that it develop 
institutions and personnel devoted to carefully comparing treatment options, 
monitoring performance through ex post RIA, and evaluating outcomes. It also 
appears crucial for the success of TTIP’s newly developed IRC model—in 
particular, for its legitimacy and democratic accountability as well as its ability 
to elicit information that could assist in learning about policy performance—to 
invite public input before, during, and after decisions in each sectoral chapter 
and on future regulatory cooperation. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
Although IRC has, so far, put a priority on reducing regulatory variation to 
reduce trade barriers, learning from regulatory variation should also be an 
important feature of IRC. Studying regulatory variation can help match 
regulatory policies to local preferences and circumstances, can help evaluate 
alternative policy options, and can help guide convergence to select optimal 
policy approaches rather than converging hastily on arbitrary or suboptimal 
approaches. IRC should thus include cooperation not only on reducing trade 
barriers through convergence but also on learning from variation about policy 
impacts and optimal policy design. 
The horizontal coherence chapter being discussed within TTIP may offer a 
new model of IRC capable of promoting the alignment of regulations while at 
the same time realizing the longer-term opportunity to learn from regulatory 
variation. TTIP offers the potential to create a standing Regulatory 
Cooperation Body, which, if equipped to study and learn from observed and 
experimental regulatory variation, could become the transatlantic regulatory 
laboratory proposed here. This may in turn represent a stepping-stone toward a 
global policy laboratory. 
Such an institutional innovation would be a new form of positive integration 
that, rather than fixating on reducing regulatory variation, could leverage the 
benefits of variation and lead over time to the design and selection of improved 
regulatory approaches. And this innovative process might occur not only 
without sacrificing regulatory autonomy but also by recognizing the value of 
regulatory variation in the search for better regulatory approaches. 
Other countries willing to join TTIP or similar IRC agreements could also 
employ this kind of policy laboratory to study and evaluate regulatory variation. 
A more multilateral and global policy laboratory could assess larger data sets 
with wider variation in policies, circumstances, and outcomes. The horizontal 
coherence chapter of TTIP, if used to create a standing transatlantic regulatory 
laboratory, might indeed emerge as a model of IRC that may spread beyond 
TTIP toward the creation of a global policy laboratory. 
Advocates of regulatory convergence—to reduce trade barriers—may, at 
first, find this proposal for learning from regulatory variation to be 
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counterintuitive. In some cases, the reasons for convergence and the regulatory 
approach to which convergence should lead may be immediately compelling. In 
other cases, regulatory variation may better match local preferences. But in 
many cases, even if convergence seems warranted, it may be unclear which 
regulatory approach should be selected for convergence, or which type of IRC 
mechanism should be used to pursue that convergence. Hence, even advocates 
of regulatory convergence may come to see that allowing—and evaluating—
regulatory variation may add a learning opportunity to international regulatory 
cooperation that enables it to better improve both regulation and trade overall. 
 
